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 The membership of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO, expanded in 1999.  This 
enlargement includes countries within the Warsaw Pact.  NATO enlargement has important consequences 
for the Alliance and the United States.  It also has tremendous consequences for the focus of the Alliance, 
the former Soviet Union, and the present day Russian Federation.   
The question of whether an active and lively debate has taken place between the branches of these 
governments on this issue, specifically between the executive and legislative branches, is explored in this 
thesis.  It explains how US foreign policy was determined by leading policy makers, and that the lack of 
discourse and debate in executive/legislative relations is counterproductive.  It describes how NATO 
enlargement became a non-issue in 1998 in the United States, and a catalyst for reactionary politics within 
Russia.  Further, it provides insight into whether this lack of debate is congruent with past relations between 
the executive and legislative branches.  The thesis also explores Russian constitutional relationships and 
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The purpose of this thesis is to study and explain why NATO enlargement was a non-issue in 
the US Senate during Spring 1998, and why no debate between the executive and legislative branches 
occurred.  The thesis explores relations between the executive and legislative branches of government, 
the recent round of NATO enlargement, and concerns about Russia. 
How enlargement affected relations between the Duma, Russia’s lower house of parliament, and 
the executive branch in Russia will be discussed.  The thesis reviews the dynamics that made this an issue 
in Russia, and how enlargement served as a catalyst for a turbulent debate in Russia’s domestic politics. 
The comparative aspect of this paper provides a basis for judgement about the development of 
the young Russian Federation.  This perspective, juxtaposed with the United States, lends insight as to 
how each has acted while on two very different levels of the playing field as active and passive 
participants in NATO’s enlargement.  The United States, as the leading nation of NATO, played an active 
role in bringing in new members to the Alliance.  Russia had no say in NATO’s decision to expand. 
The literature reviewed in this study included newspaper articles, books, the North Atlantic 
Treaty, articles published in scholarly journals and theses, the Internet and World Wide Web.  These 
sources allowed me to describe how NATO enlargement was debated in 1998, and how inter-branch 




























The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) expanded in 1999.  This 
enlargement includes countries formerly under the sphere of influence of the Warsaw Pact and 
the Soviet Union.  The enlargement is in accordance with the decisions of the Allied Heads of 
State and Government at the Summit Meeting in Madrid in July 1997. 
This enlargement has obvious consequences for the Alliance and the United States.  It 
also has consequences for the focus of the Alliance, the former Soviet Union, and the present 
day Russian Federation.  Has an active and lively debate taken place between the legislative 
and executive branches of the governments involved?  This thesis explains how US foreign 
policy was determined by leading policy makers, without debate between the branches of 
government.  I will discuss how NATO enlargement became a non-issue in 1998 in the 
United States, and a catalyst for reactionary domestic politics in Russia.  Further, I will 
provide insight into whether this lack of debate is congruent with past relations between the 
executive and legislative branches in both countries.  For Russia, I will examine the 
constitutional relationship between the two branches and how this relationship affected the 




























II.  PERSPECTIVES ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
THE EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE BRANCHES AND FOREIGN 
POLICY 
A. UNITED STATES 
Throughout American history, the tug-of-war between the executive and legislative 
branches of government pulled power from one branch to the other regarding foreign policy 
making.  Until the 1970’s, Presidential power and prerogative in the arena of foreign affairs 
outdistanced Congress’s authority. 
Throughout the 20th century, it had been assumed that the American president held 
authority in dealing with the growing communist threat, building diplomatic relations around the 
world and charting courses of war and peace for the United States.  Two events changed all 
of this. 
US participation in the Vietnam War met with turmoil.  Constituents at home in 
congressional districts gave voice to growing concerns.  Due to a groundswell of changing 
public opinion about US activities overseas and the direction of American foreign policy, 
Congress made strides to narrow the gap between itself and the overpowering executive 
branch.  Congress began to assert its power and influence in both defense planning and 
foreign policy making.1 
International affairs, which once seemed a topic for the elite, became a fixture in 
American living rooms each evening with the nightly news.  Congressmen reacted to this new 
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interest by engaging in debates about foreign affairs.  Often, congressional involvement in 
foreign policy was to the chagrin of the executive branch. 
President Reagan failed in his attempt to roll back statutes that increased 
Congressional involvement in what had previously been solely the president’s playing ground.2  
Reagan hoped to capitalize on perceptions that US policy blunders abroad could be blamed 
on Congress’s rise in prominence in the international arena.  His plan did not work, and, in 
fact, legislative activism increased throughout the 1980s.  The congressional bureaucratic 
machine continued to grow. 
Defense planning and foreign policy have traditionally been considered the domain of 
the executive branch.  Over the past three decades, this dominance has shifted, and Congress 
has increased its role and power in the determination of policy.  This recent rise of legislative 
activism leads to the question of why this activism did not appear in the recent debate over 
NATO enlargement. 
Despite attempts by the executive branch to limit congressional growth in power, 
Congress continued to experience increased gains in its role regarding foreign policy.  
Congress subsequently experienced dynamic growth in bureaucratic numbers and political 
power in this field. 
The argument that NATO enlargement experienced no earnest debate between the 
branches of the US government is puzzling, and will be considered in this paper within the 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
1Barry M. Blechman, The Politics of National Security, Oxford University Press, 1990, p.9 
2 Ibid  
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framework of congressional and executive relations.  How have these relations evolved, and 
how has this evolution led up to the recent passage of the enlargement? 
B. RUSSIAN FEDERATION  
The dissolution of the USSR created an institutional gridlock of competing claims for 
power, legitimacy and authority in the new Russian Federation.3  Russia's parliamentary 
election and constitutional referendum approved December 12, 1993, laid the framework for 
future relations between the Duma and the Russian president.   
The election and referendum was intended to normalize politics in Russia after more 
than a year of tumultuous confrontation between the executive and legislative branches.  Such 
hopes were only partly fulfilled.  The constitution, which solidified Boris Yeltsin's position, 
passed with less than 60% of the vote.  Russia now has a strong presidency, and a weaker 
legislative branch filled with a variety of parties.   
The presidency's sweeping powers concerned those who wondered about Yeltsin's 
eventual successor.4  It is too early to tell Vladimir Putin’s legacy, and he is not a factor in the 
NATO enlargement debate that took place in 1998.  The Duma consists of various parties 
with views that did not conform with Yeltsin's political views on domestic issues or foreign 
policy. These differences showed during the internal debate regarding NATO enlargement.  I 
will review how this issue affected Russian politics and Russian policy making. 
 
                                                                 
3 Russia's Parliamentary Election and Constitutional Referendum, Commission on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe, January 1994 
4 Ibid 
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C. THE CONSTITUTION OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION 
The Preamble to the Constitution of the Russian Federation begins with one of the 
hallmarks of democracy and democratization.5  The first line of this preamble defines the 
identity of the people of the Russian Federation as ‘multinational.’6  An attitude toward 
multinationalism contributes to the democratization of countries worldwide, and is proven to 
be an auspicious beginning for constitutions of newly democratic states.  The Articles of the 
Russian Constitution are similar to the US Constitution and other modern constitutions, with 
civil liberties and the separation of powers enumerated in an orderly fashion. 
In Chapter IV, Article 80, the constitution clearly delegates power to the Russian 
president to define foreign policy and to represent the country in international relations.  
Chapter IV continues to outline the powers of the presidency.  This chapter gives authority 
over issues of national security, armed forces and international diplomatic representatives.   
Article 86 gives perhaps the clearest definition of the president’s authority over foreign 
matters.  This states that the president shall conduct the foreign policy of the Federation, 
conduct negotiations and sign treaties, sign instruments of ratification and accept credentials 
and instruments of recall of diplomatic representatives accredited with him.  There is no similar 
clause, nor any clause describing any foreign policy powers for the Duma. 
The effort members of the Duma engage in to influence policy is strengthened by their 
close proximity to the electorate.  Members of the Duma are effective in influencing policy by 
using their ability to pass laws, and approve the appointment of prime minister for the 
                                                                 
5 Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave, University of Oklahoma Press, 1991, p.37 
6 The Constitution of the Russian Federation, Ratified December 12, 1993 
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president.  The Duma’s close relationship to voters sways the executive branch and influences 














































III.  BACKGROUND OF THE RECENT PROCESS OF ENLARGEMENT 
 
NATO completed its most recent round of enlargement in 1999.  This enlargement is 
the fourth in the history of the 50-year-old alliance.  According to Article 10 of the North 
Atlantic Treaty, the organization may, upon unanimous consent of its members, invite other 
European states to join if the invitees further the principles of the treaty and contribute to the 
security of the North Atlantic area. 
In 1995, NATO outlined the process for expansion.  NATO decided to pursue this 
fourth enlargement over a period of years.  The alliance chose to invite Poland, the Czech 
Republic and Hungary because these countries meet NATO's minimum requirements for 
membership.  Although there is no formal checklist for membership, criteria do exist for 
interested nations.7  To gain membership, nations must: uphold democracy, including tolerating 
diversity; be progressing toward a market economy; have their military forces under firm 
civilian control; be good neighbors and respect the sovereignty of other nations; and work 
toward interoperability with NATO forces. 
 
A. UNITED STATES 
The role of the United States in the process of enlargement is great.  First, the United 
States is the largest and most powerful member of the alliance.  Second, the top commander 
                                                                 




of NATO, the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, has always been an American.  
Certainly, the US role in creating the framework of enlargement matches its preeminence in 
the alliance. 
According to Article 14 of the North Atlantic Treaty, prospective new members of 
the Alliance must deposit their instruments of accession, or membership, with the Government 
of the United States.  The US serves as the depositary of the Treaty.  Only at that point will 
the prospects become new members.8  While symbolic of NATO membership, this role is 
underlying evidence of the importance of US involvement in the alliance. 
A review of the past year's public debate over NATO enlargement gives rise to the 
observation that US policy makers all but ignored this issue.  And while public debate took 
place, it took place with futility; there was never a serious or potent effort to sway opinion.  
By beginning the current process of enlargement over a period of years, NATO became a 
non-issue in American politics. 
 
 
B. RUSSIAN FEDERATION 
The dynamics of the relationship between the Duma and President Yeltsin influenced 
the public debate in Russia.  The Duma reacted to Yeltsin’s role as Russia’s president by 
ignoring its limited role in determining Russia’s foreign policy, and voicing its concerns about 
the enlargement.  This was cause for Yeltsin to react.  These actions affected Russian relations 
with NATO allies, expansion candidates and NATO foes, alike, and which will be discussed 
                                                                 
8 NATO Basic Fact Sheet, NATO’s Enlargement, http://www.nato.int/docu/facts/enl.htm 
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elsewhere.  NATO did make efforts to include Russia into general dialogue of NATO actions 
with the forming of the NATO-Russian Council. 
Russia's role certainly differed from the one taken by the United States.  Russia, 
NATO's historical antagonist, reacted negatively to the prospect of the creeping border of 
NATO's alliance.  After the parliamentary election and referendum, it was widely believed 
that Russian objections to NATO enlargement into former Soviet Bloc states would outweigh 
those in NATO that wished to protect these budding democracies through a formal alliance.9  

























































IV.  ARENA OF DISCOURSE AND DEBATE 
 
A. UNITED STATES 
NATO enlargement demanded little attention by the time it came to a vote in the US 
Senate.  Leading up to the vote, Senators did make use of several venues to declare their 
positions on various issues.  Policy makers and opinion leaders made use of the print media to 
advocate their views on enlargement.  Many opinion leaders and newspaper columnists 
lamented the lack of debate within the Senate.10 
The concerns they raised, however,  never stirred public debate.  Senator Connie 
Mack of Florida attributed the absence of debate to the lack of interest on Main Street. 
Senators did little to encourage interest in the issue with their constituents.  The historical role 
of the Senate in participating in treaties and foreign affairs discussion fell by the wayside. 
Senator Mack's observation is important. While this issue has implications for US 
policy, it hardly raised an interest among average Americans.11  And while the foreign policy 
elite debated the topic across the pages of editorial sections and journals, the issue failed to 
catch both the imagination and attention of the American public.  
According to a Pew Research Center opinion survey, only 5% of those questioned 
followed the NATO enlargement issue closely compared to almost half who followed the 
Spring 1998 clash with Iraqi President Saddam Hussein.  The deference that legislators had 
shown the executive branch during the 1950's, while communism was a concern among 
                                                                 
10 David S. Broder, “Deciding NATO's Future Without Debate,” Washington Post, March 18, 1998 
11 Tyler Marshall, “US Public Acutely Uninterested in Vote on NATO,” Los Angeles Times, April 8, 1998 
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Americans, is different from this example of legislative indifference.  There is no great fear of 
enlarging or not enlarging, nor is there an explicit threat. 
Paradoxically, high level legislators and statesmen have participated in bringing this 
debate out to the public.  Former presidential candidate and Senate Majority Leader Bob 
Dole, among many others, promoted enlargement citing among other things, reasons not to 
postpone a vote.12  One might figure that a rush to vote is tantamount to stifling debate.  An 
alternative viewpoint is that there was little to debate for the sides were drawn long before 
enlargement was an issue on the Senate floor in 1998. 
A review of editorials written by members of the Senate reveals that leaders of both 
parties, and, notably, of the party fringes, supported enlargement.  Republican Party centrists 
argued for the main points of the issue, while tearing apart the message of detractors.13  
Senators Roth and Lugar claimed that critics of enlargement were misrepresenting the minutia 
of the issue.  Roth and Lugar argued that the Open Door clause in the North Atlantic Treaty 
did not lead NATO down a slippery slope of inviting all comers into the alliance. 
Among those who actively sought to turn the tide of Senate opinion was a bipartisan 
group of 15 former legislators.14   These concerned statesmen argued that there was a 
multitude of issues that warranted attention and that enlargement in itself was a serious 
mistake. 
Concerns for the lack of security in Russia due to the closing in of NATO's border 
was a major issue to consider.  This issue did happen to be one small sticking point in the 
                                                                 
12 Bob Dole, “NATO Test of US Leadership,” Washington Times, March 18, 1998 
13 William V. Roth and Richard G. Lugar, “NATO's Open Door,” Washington Times, March 18 1998 
14 Jim Abdnor, et al., “NATO Expansion is a Serious Mistake,” Washington Times, March 12, 1998 
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debate about expansion, though it never threatened the passage of the acceptance of new 
members.  Divergent interest groups also aligned themselves against expansion to influence the 
Senate, though there was never a chance that enough senators would sign on to that side of 
the cause.15 
The pages of leading newspapers did become an arena for debate of the topic of 
NATO enlargement.  The minority opposing the issue, however, never gathered support for 
their argument.  And the majority, bolstered by both political parties and the White House, 
never faced a serious threat of changing public attitudes and opinion.  NATO enlargement 
became an issue that called for little attention during the end of the approval process by the 
United States Senate or the president.  As a member of NATO, and literally in the driver’s 
seat, the United States played a decisive role in determining the future of the alliance.  The 
substantial role played by the United States did not factor into the debate over enlargement. 
The downfall of the Soviet Union has given congressmen lower political costs when 
disagreeing with the president.16  The absence of an immediate threat also gave members of 
Congress lower political costs for inaction on issues of national interest and security.  
Alternatively, Congress and the president both are in agreement that a stronger NATO 
reduces a possible long term threat. 
 
                                                                 
15 National Journal, April 11, 1998 
16 James M. Lindsay, Congress and the Politics of US Foreign Policy, The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1994 
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B. RUSSIAN FEDERATION AND EXECUTIVE/LEGISLATIVE RELATIONS 
PERTAINING TO NEW NATO MEMBERS 
In contrast with the United States, leaders of Russia's political parties took an active 
role discussing the perceived merits, or rather the critical lapses, of NATO enlargement.  
These leaders made NATO enlargement an opportunity to attack the executive branch 
although a majority of the population in Russia ignored the issue.17  Issues of more importance 
remained crime and wages, the Russian Diaspora, the disappearance of national resources, 
restoring national dignity and returning to superpower status. 
Aleksei Arbatov, member of the Duma's Yabloko party knows the issue is not a 
major point for the general public: “Foreign policy is always a preoccupation of the elites."18 
Arbatov also cited that the public’s unease divides along generational lines.  The older 
generations have stronger feelings about the Cold War, and that younger Russians do not 
have the institutional memories of Russian imperialism.  The issue, he continued, is one that 
affected diplomacy with the West, and that it has stirred up disagreement domestically 
between political parties in the Duma and the executive branch. 
Contrasting the US example of little debate, Russia shrugged off its passive role in this 
matter.  The Russian branches of government, both members of the Duma and Yeltsin’s 
administration, used NATO’s growing alliance as opportunities to communicate their dismay 
with changes in the international community, and to stake out political positions at home and 
abroad. 
                                                                 
17 Tatiana Parkhalina,, NATO Review, Web Edition, NO.3, May-June 1997, vol.45, pp.l 1-15 
18 Michael R. Gordon, “Russia Still Uneasy about Expansion by Western Alliance,” New York Times, March 
13, 1999 
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This period of time was one of evolution for inter-branch relations in the Russian 
Federation.  Political activism in the Duma ran counter to major public concerns.  However, 
politicians used these issues to put pressure on the executive branch.  Parties in the Duma 
made issue out of many NATO actions and brought the president closer to their position.  
Russia’s passive role in NATO’s enlargement did not hamper the legislative branch’s desire to 
move and influence the policy making of the Yeltsin administration. 
 Members of Russia’s State Duma, as well as officials of Yeltsin’s Government visited 
and met with leadership of the prospective new members of NATO in early June 1997.  During 
these visits, and interviews with media, Russian politicians gave varied responses to NATO 
expansion. 
 These responses included attitudes of accepting gradual enlargement and dealing with 
matter of fact nonchalance to declarations of economic warfare and the redrawing of borders 
that have been the subject of dispute for centuries.  Certainly, political ideology was a leader in 
opinion making for these members of the Duma, but the balance of Russian political power and 
the consideration for Russia’s appearance on the international stage was also a factor in the 
calculation. 
 1. Poland    
 In June of 1997, Polish Deputy Defense Minister Andrej Karkoszka met with Russian 
officials in Moscow.  His impression of Russian attitudes toward Poland’s membership in 
NATO seemed quite grim.19  He left Russia with the impression that Russian officials would 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
 
19 Piotr Jendroszcyk, “Russia May Mount Obstacles,” Warsaw Rzeczpospolita, June 5, 1997 
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take actions to delay NATO members from ratifying Poland’s treaty with the alliance.  “The 
Russian diplomacy will attempt to stall this process, influencing Western political circles that 
have doubts whether admitting us to the pact is a correct move”, said Karkoszka. 
 While in Russia, Karkosza met both with members of Yeltsin’s administration and the 
Duma.  This was early political posturing of the two Russian branches.  This approach was short 
lived, and Russian leaders swiftly shifted to more polite terms of communicating disappointment 
regarding an enlarged alliance. 
Vladimir Lukin, chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee in the Duma lamented that 
Poland’s new status changed the dividing line in Europe, but does not put an end to the division 
itself.20  “Poland might play a useful role if it had a foreign policy of its own instead of imitating 
other countries’ policies.  After all, you could carry out a policy that is more sensitive to eastern 
problems,” said Lukin. 
By March of 1998, then Prime Minister Primakov stressed that there was no crisis in 
Polish-Russian relations.21  In fact, by this time, the entry of the three new NATO members was 
not an issue in Polish relations with Russia whatsoever.  Lukin and Primakov were not on 
different pages discussing relations between Poland and Russia, however, they communicated 
differently the way that Russia felt betrayed by eastern countries reliance on western political 
and military ideology. 
                                                                 
20 Waclaw Radziwinowicz, “From Duma on Poland in NATO; This Humiliates Russia,” Warsaw Gazeta 
Wyborcza, October 23, 1998 
21 “Poland’s Geremek Sees Moscow More Relaxed Over NATO Entry,” Warsaw TV Polonia Network, 
March 4, 1998 
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The Russia-NATO Founding Act guaranteed Russia a presence within NATO without 
decision-making powers.  However, Russia’s activism may give them a larger role in influencing 
security strategy affecting Russia and throughout Europe in the future. 
 2. Hungary 
 Much like the Polish overtures, Hungarian leaders have also cited repeatedly the 
importance of strong Hungarian-Russian relations.22  In fact, this importance had been stressed 
so much that both Hungary and Russia declared that Hungary’s membership in NATO would 
not bring about deterioration in their relationship.   
Although Russia views Hungary’s decision to join NATO as mistaken and cedes that 
the relationship is not free of problems, Russia will not let Hungary’s transition have a negative 
impact on bilateral relations.  Lukin said that Russia was going out of its way to ensure that 
Hungary’s faulty security strategy would not affect Russia’s relations with Hungary.23 
At the same time, Russia’s then prime minister, Viktor Chernomyrdin was sacked by Boris 
Yeltsin.  When asked about this dismissal, Lukin demurred to Yeltsin’s delayed action on this 
matter, but not due to NATO enlargement.  Lukin was concerned about the government’s 
inability to solve the country’s economic crisis, social problems, corruption and crime. 
3. The Czech Republic  
 When Seleznev expressed his remorse over the Czech Republic joining NATO in 
March 1999, he also allayed fears that Russia may change the status of its relations with one of 
NATO’s newest members.24  Lukin made a similar statement two years earlier in April 1997.  
                                                                 
22 “Hungarian, Russian Legislators View Bilateral Relations,” Budapest MTI, 23 March 1998 
23 Ibid 
24 “Seleznev Against Czech NATO Membership,” Prague CTK, March 11, 1999 
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He stated that the Czech Republic joining the alliance would have no direct consequences.25  
However, he did link NATO enlargement with the ratification of the START-2 treaty.  While 
enlargement will have no affect on relations with the Czech Republic, he views a direct 
relationship between NATO enlargement and START-2. 
 One year later in April 1998, Lukin further declared that the Czech Republic would be 
exercising its rights by joining a defensive union.26  Lukin spoke in terms of tier ranked relations 
and security.  He defined possible terms of relations between European states as levels of 
friendship, comparing a good neighborhood to an ordinary neighborhood.  With the joining of 
the Czech Republic to NATO, Lukin likened relations to the latter.   
 Seleznev’s public statement that relations would go untouched contrasted with the fiery 
announcement by Duma member Vladimir Zhirinovsky that the Czech Republic would become 
an enemy of the Russian state due to its entry into NATO.  Zhirinovsky further added that 
economic sanctions would be the first policy used as revenge for joining the alliance. 
 Duma President Gennady Seleznev only conceded that Russia would not be happy 
about the creeping borders of NATO coming ever closer to the Russian frontier.  He was 
particularly displeased by the eminent addition of new weapons and technologies to be 




                                                                 
25 “Official: ‘Confidence’ Different After Czech NATO Entry,” Prague CTK, April 14, 1997 
26 Valery Yenin, “Duma’s Lukin: Czech Republic Exercised Right to Join NATO,” Prague CTK. April 17, 1998 
27 Ibid 
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4. Evolving Relations on this Matter 
 Lukin, Seleznev and Zhirinovskiy represent different views of how Russia will deal with 
NATO’s enlargement within the Russian Duma.  Their views tell a very important tale because 
they have had greater longevity in the Duma than many of the ministers that Yeltsin had 
employed in his cabinet during his presidency, including former prime ministers Chernomyrdin 
and Primakov. 
 While the members of Russia’s Duma have more longevity, and perhaps greater stability 
in their jobs, they use this advantage to influence Russian policy.  With closer ties to the 
electorate, and greater staying power in their jobs, members of the Duma have strong opinion 
leading positions in Russian politics.  They also appear to have a more coherent and better 
communicated plan for Eastern European security policy than their executive branch 
counterparts. 
 This security policy is to be formed and focused with Eastern Europe in mind, rather 
than the strong Western influenced and dominated view of both Europe and Russia.  Duma 
leaders wish that Russia had the influence symbollically equivalent to its height as a super power, 
forming and molding the security outlook for all of Eastern Europe.  However, this is not meant 
as a desire to restore the Warsaw Pact.  Many in the Duma desire Eastern European countries 
to design security arrangements central to the region’s needs, not needs perceived by NATO. 
Russia does not have super power status any longer.  However painful this may be, 
both legislative and executive leaders of Russia are dealing with a world that is changing 
without their leadership.  Their stature will continue to wane until Russia discovers new 






































V.  EXECUTIVE/LEGISLATIVE RELATIONS 
 
A. UNITED STATES 
The Clinton administration took the lead on the issue of NATO enlargement.  
Enlargement became a torch carried by President Clinton.  He had championed the issue for 
the three years following the Madrid Summit.28  Clinton, Secretary of State Madeleine 
Albright and other top-level administration officials pressed the Senate hard on passing the 
enlargement legislation. 
Albright's argument relied upon the theory that democracies do not fight one another.  
Therefore, by joining the alliance and by strengthening their democratic institutions, these 
countries will increase the area of Europe in which war does not happen any longer.  
Secretary of Defense Cohen denied that NATO expansion would be viewed as a backward 
measure in relations with Russia.29 
Clinton's leadership calmed Senate fears of rapid enlargement and delayed any pause 
in increasing NATO membership until after the last round of expansion.30  The overwhelming 
acceptance of NATO enlargement gave way only to recommendations for  prudence and 
caution for future rounds.  Many also supported Senator Warner’s proposal for a three year 
waiting period before an additional expansion of NATO is considered. 
                                                                 
28 Thomas W. Lippmann and Helen Dewar, “Senate Giving NATO Expansion a Virtual Free Ride,” 
Washington Post, March 8,1998 
29 Nancy E. Roman and Sean Scully, “NATO Expansion Gets a White House Push,” Washington Times April 
28, 1998 
30 Warren P. Strobel, “Clinton Lobbies Senate for Expanded NATO,” Washington Times, February 12, 1998 
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To ensure smooth passage for NATO enlargement through the Senate, the Clinton 
administration opened a position in the State Department to deal solely with building support 
for the bill and to help guide it to victory.31  Clinton needed to make sure enlargement 
worked, otherwise he would have seemed to judge its priority poorly by declaring it a major 
policy initiative during his tenure in office. 
In fact, Senator Lugar, an advocate of the expansion, believed that the bold move by 
Clinton to make NATO enlargement an important issue put the Senate in a sensitive position.  
As a major thrust of the president's foreign policy, the Senate would be viewed as 
undermining the standing of the United States within Europe if the amendment to the treaty 
was rejected.32 
To insure against such rejection, a unique offensive was crafted by the Clinton 
administration to woo Senator Jesse Helms, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee.  Senator Helms is a man in a position to wreak havoc on Clinton's foreign policy 
goals.  He had done so in the past by blocking and delaying ambassadorships from Senate 
confirmation, and could conceivably block or stall other important votes from reaching the 
Senate floor.  His leadership of Senate Republicans is strong, and his leadership of 
conservative Republicans is unmatched. 
In light of this, Secretary Albright worked closely with Senator Helms to iron out 
differences in Clinton’s and the senior senator from North Carolina's positions.33  Helms had 
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33 Jesse Helms, “NATO Expansion Has All The Safeguards It Needs,” Wall Street Journal, March 
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many reservations about the focus and direction of Clinton's foreign policy team, and such 
close cooperation was shrewd political maneuvering on the part of Albright and Clinton. 
An applicable question for review was whether it was actually the Clinton 
administration that came out first to propel NATO enlargement to the top of the foreign policy 
agenda?  While Clinton had placed this policy on his agenda in 1995, Congress had been a 
proponent since 1994.  In that year, Congress began an annual tradition of passing legislation 
in support of NATO enlargement.34  And, in 1996, the issue of enlargement was on both the 
Republican and Democratic presidential platforms.  NATO enlargement was a foregone 
conclusion before the non-debate of 1998. 
The executive branch of government worked closely with the Senate regarding the 
issue of NATO enlargement.  Both branches had similar positions before the vote on the latest 
amendment of the North Atlantic Treaty.  However, Senate opinion leaders had some 
misgivings about the executive branch's focus and interest in including the Senate in foreign 
policy decision-making, as well as appropriate concerns over details.   
The issue did not cause much debate within the Senate, for constituent concerns did 
not demand such attention.  While Clinton did take the most recent lead in pushing forward 
the current round of expansion, consensus existed across party lines and ideologies to support 
NATO enlargement dating back a number of years. 
Activism in both branches led to a resolution of the issue early on in the debate.  By 
building bipartisan consensus between party leadership, both the executive and legislative 
                                                                 
34 Nancy E. Roman and Sean Scully 
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branches dodged intense disagreement over NATO enlargement.  Once Clinton pushed the 
issue forward on the agenda, Congress deferred to his leadership. 
B. RUSSIAN FEDERATION 
Yeltsin had a different view of the initiative to expand NATO.  The activist parties 
elected to the Duma in 1993 exhibited much distaste for the closing in of NATO to Russian 
borders and to former Soviet Republics.  Most of the acting out by Yeltsin and his 
administration on enlargement was due to the surprising showing by fringe politicians in the 
election. 
The great shock of the election was the strong showing by Vladimir Zhirinovsky's 
Liberal Democratic Party.  This group won about 15 percent of the seats in the Duma. 
Zhirinovsky promotes ideas such as nuclear war, a return to Imperial borders, and Russian 
expansion to the Indian Ocean. 
Views like Zhirinovsky's and the anti-Western Russian Communist Party, led by 
Gennady Zyuganov literally countered the strong presidency Russian voters approved in 
1993.  Yeltsin realized the necessity to work amicably with parties in the Duma, formulating 
policy with their consent.35 
Russian Duma President Gennadiy Seleznev commented on this change of politics, 
commenting that it "is really a phenomenon.  It can be explained by the fact that we (Russia) 
now virtually have a coalition government even though the President does not want to call it 
that." 
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Issues ranging from START-2 to the conflict in Kosovo and throughout the Balkans 
affected and altered Russian perspectives of NATO enlargement.  The Duma affected foreign 
policy by raising each of these issues with Yeltsin.  This caused Russia to warn numerous 
times that former Soviet Republics should never be considered for NATO membership.  
Russia also has called for a reduction of NATO troops and forces in member states.  Russia’s 
















































VI.  DISTRACTIONS FROM THE ISSUE OF NATO ENLARGEMENT 
 
Both the executive and legislative branches of the US government experienced major 
distractions from any possible policy debate during 1998.  The Clinton administration was 
beset by a scandal that involved a high profile and intrusive investigation.  This scandal 
evolved into an impeachment with serious consequences for both the nation and policy 
makers in Washington, DC.  The Senate reacted to the growing scandal as it did with other 
issues, it served as another delay for the debate on enlargement.36  But there were other issues 
that demanded attention of the Senate, as well as concerns of constituents that drew the 
attention of senators away from NATO enlargement. 
The United States became engaged militarily against Iraq during the time period in 
which the Senate was to bring up the issue of NATO enlargement.  Troubles with Iraq 
continued to plague US foreign policy makers since the winter months of 1998, and after a 
deal that UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan brokered with Saddam Hussein.37  The problem 
with Annan’s deal was that Hussein continued to bluff just as he had throughout the year.  The 
United States became engaged in sporadic attacks on Iraq. 
Activist political parties within the Duma affected Russian policy regarding Iraq.  This 
detracted from Western attempts to thwart Hussein, and at the same time Prime Minister 
Primakov's efforts to resolve the conflict growing with Iraq were diplomatic and 
statesmanlike.  His work was more effective than any other diplomat save Annan. 
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March 25, 1998 
37 David D. Newsom, “Time to Get Real About Iraq,” Christian Science Monitor, March 11, 1998  
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Issues as varied as Iraq and Clinton's scandals met with homespun issues such as 
education.  Democrats maligned Republicans by claiming that the Republican Party did not 
care much about domestic issues like education.  Senator Joseph Biden claimed that the topic 
of enlargement was being used as filler to stop a debate on education from taking place.38  
This claim is unsustained since there was hardly much debate on NATO enlargement anyway.  
It further suggests how little an impact this issue made on America’s policy makers during this 
period. 
A number of issues, including international confrontation, scandal and domestic policy, 
served as distractions to the Senate.  These distractions took away from what may have 
become a substantive debate on NATO enlargement, however unlikely that outcome may 
have been.  Fortunately, these distractions were not used politically as reasons for or against 
NATO enlargement between the two branches of the US.  In Russia, this flare up was cause 
to react diplomatically with Iraq to soothe the problem. However, this diplomacy showed a 
rift with the West.39  In particular, it showed Russian differences with Western attitudes 
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VII.  CONCERN FOR RUSSIA  THIS NEEDS TO BEGIN ON NEW AND ODD 
PAGE # 
 
This is the first round of enlargement since the end of the Cold War and the downfall 
of the former Soviet Union.  The fall of the Eastern Bloc created the by-product of new, 
fledgling democracies.  These new democracies are the stock from which NATO is choosing 
its new members. 
Russia is experiencing a shift in allegiance by other formerly communist states toward 
NATO.  By accepting membership in NATO, these new states bring Russia's borders and 
NATO's borders to their closest points in history.  Some agree that Russia perceives NATO 
as a threat in the region.40  Secretary of Defense William Cohen, however stated the US 
position and denied that an enlarged NATO alliance is a threat to Russia.41 
Russia is not in a strong military position. The Russian Army is currently downsizing 
and selling off its arsenal.42  NATO has done much to calm Russian fears of the alliance 
creeping upon Russian borders, and NATO leadership realized the importance of a strong 
NATO-Russian relationship.  By creating the NATO-Russia Council, proponents of 
enlargement were able to demonstrate open lines of communication with the Russians, and 
deflect attacks of antagonizing the former Soviet Union. 
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In the United States, concern for Russia was a no more objectionable reason for the 
inclusion of new members into NATO than any other dispute.43  While policy makers dwelled 
on the subject, concern for Russia did not change the course of debate, nor did it impact the 
debate.  Congressional leaders let such concerns fall by the wayside just as they let the larger 
issue of enlargement fall off the table while dealing with the executive branch during the Spring 
of 1998. 
Russians, however, felt strongly about the perceived threat NATO presented to their 
Western frontier.  So much so, that Russia's position regarding the START-2 treaty became 
linked to NATO's overtures toward the Baltic States.  Russian politicians began to balk at a 
relationship between NATO and the Baltic countries.44 
START-2 became unacceptable to Russia mostly because of NATO's possible 
enlargement into the Baltic States.  Its passage will continue to be affected if NATO doesn't 
clarify its intentions for possible expansion into parts of the former Soviet Union.  Such a stand 
was, in effect, mobilized by NATO's recent round of enlargement.  Although Yeltsin called for 
the most expedient ratification of the START-2 treaty, the opposition in the Duma has linked 
ratification with NATO enlargement along with a myriad of other issues including Iraq and the 
conflict in Kosovo.45 
Lukin dismissed the idea that the Duma’s stalling on START-2 is propelling Central 
and Eastern European countries to rush and join NATO.46  “Give up the idea of joining 
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44 Tallinn, BNS, December 14, 1998 
45 Natalya Panshina, “Russian Presidential Team Views Duma Politics in START II,” Itar-Tass, December 15, 
1998 
46 Prague CTK, “Official: Confidence’ Different After Czech NATO Entry,” April 14, 1997 
 33
NATO and I will be the first to press for the ratification of the START-2 treaty,” Lukin said, 
adding that it was just the fall of Russia’s confidence in the West given the planned NATO 
expansion that prevents the ratification of the treaty.47 
 Regardless the ratification of START-2, Yeltsin’s main task was to convince Duma 
leaders that the NATO-Russia Council is a good idea, and delivers the respect, stature and 
influence expected of a world power.48  This agreement guaranteed that Russia may be 
present for the making of all the important decisions of NATO, but without the right of veto 
much less a vote.  This may prove a difficult task for Yeltsin’s successors, but Russian leaders 
are now faced with integrating as much they can with the changing face of Europe, or face 
isolation.   
NATO’s campaign in Kosovo severely affected relations with Russia.  Russia reacted 
to NATO’s plans for postwar Kosovo by moving in a surprise deployment of troops to 
Pristina airport.49  This act brought about negotiations between both NATO and Russian 
military commanders in which Russia earned a piece of the peacekeeping role in the aftermath 
of NATO’s victory over Serbia.50  The outcome over the war in Kosovo is still unclear to 
determine which path Russia may take, but will surely make a mark on Russia’s worldview. 
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VIII.  CONCLUSION 
 
A. UNITED STATES 
The evolution of executive and legislative relations regarding the issue of NATO 
enlargement leaves many questions to be answered.  In a historical perspective, how might 
one account for the interaction between these two branches of government?  The deference 
shown by Congress toward the executive branch leading up through the 1960's was indicative 
of a Congress unaffected by constituent awareness of issues abroad rather than cooperation 
with the President. 
Congress began to step into the fray during the Vietnam War.  From that point, the 
legislative branch began to wage attempts to limit presidential powers in foreign policy.51  On 
the issue of NATO enlargement, however, the branches of government didn't engage in any 
pushing or pulling over the direction of the debate. 
In fact, an active or purposeful debate regarding NATO enlargement was missing 
from Spring 1998’s Senate vote amending the North Atlantic Treaty to include former Soviet 
Bloc nations in the alliance.  Due to prior agreement on the issue, shrewd and clever work 
between the executive and legislative branches, and various issues competing for 
policy-makers attention, NATO enlargement became a forgone conclusion and a relative 
non-issue. 
As the fourth expansion of NATO in 50 years, one might suspect that changes to this 
successful alliance would stir up much debate.  Review of the public debate over enlargement, 
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however, shows that there was never a strong or persuasive attempt to change the opinions of 
policy-makers.  Despite appeals to raise a debate by present and former statesmen, the issue 
never caught on with constituents or built up inertia for an opposing position.  This lack of 
interest in the issue propelled the branches into a cozy relationship, with no conflict, and a 
quiet path to pushing this item forward on the agenda and through the US Senate. 
The US Senate and President Clinton's administration worked closely together to iron 
out major details of enlargement.  By doing so, Clinton was able to bring leaders from both 
parties together in agreement.  The executive branch was able to create a broad general 
consensus that was impenetrable by fringe movements and detractors. Both the Senate and 
Clinton had been posturing for a number of years in support of NATO enlargement. 
With a broad consensus built into the issue of enlargement, distractions came easily to 
the US Senate.  The erstwhile confrontations with Iraq, Clinton's scandals, domestic issues 
and plain partisanship provided opportunities to switch the topic of debate in the Senate.  
Valid concerns about Russia's reaction to enlargement were dealt with swiftly and responsibly.  
NATO found a way to include Russia in its dialogue without giving away true decision making 
powers.  None of these distractions or issues actually impacted the substance or outcome of 
the debate. 
The evidence and discussion above provide a firm foundation from which to study and 
analyze the decision making process and level of discourse joined by the executive and 
legislative branches of the US government regarding NATO enlargement.  US foreign policy 
was determined before the issue appeared before the Senate in the Spring of 1998.  An active 
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and substantive debate did not occur, and NATO enlargement itself was a non-issue.  But what 
does this all mean? 
The relationship between the executive and legislative branches continues to evolve 
and change.  The historical battle over the minutia of foreign policy between the branches did 
not take place during the passage of NATO enlargement.  Could this issue have been immune 
to previous battles over foreign policy making?  There are two reasons why the branches did 
not spend superfluous amounts of time on this issue.  First, the general public does not care 
about issues regarding NATO since the fall of the Soviet Union.  Second, leadership in the 
two branches had been agreeing on enlargement for a period of years previous to its passage 
in the Senate. 
Perhaps during this stage of relations, we have learned that by building consensus and 
working together, the branches can agree on issues and pass legislation that enjoy mutual 
support.  However, if public opinion had been vocal, we may have seen a very different 
outcome.  That makes the study of politics so unscientific, since we can rarely repeat 
experiments like the passage of NATO enlargement.  However, had public opinion been 
vocal, we may have seen this issue develop along a much different route.  The next test will be 
during a future round of enlargement.  Will US concern be about Russia, or another 
continental power? 
 
B. RUSSIAN FEDERATION 
The passage of the Russian Federation constitution created a strong presidency. This 
has not stopped the rising strength of parliamentary parties that raise issues to detract from the 
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executive.  It is extraordinary to consider the great distance relations have drifted between the 
branches since the constitutional referendum.  Despite the constitutional functions of the two 
branches, political parties in the Duma will continue to sway the otherwise more powerful 
executive.  Considering the economic and social turmoil Russia is experiencing today, any 
populist rhetoric may affect the electorate and national policy as a whole. 
This is evident in the Duma’s reactionary policy toward NATO and the West over 
NATO’s expansionist policy with former Soviet Republics, especially the Baltic States.  
Pressure forced Yeltsin to back away from a warm relationship with the Partnership for Peace 
and the NATO-Russia Council due to political concerns.  Yeltsin’s administration also made 
claims that NATO must not creep eastward.  However, he has retreated from his demands.  
A future Russian president also is likely to retreat from this position as well. 
Other foreign policy issues have been gravely affected.  The START-2 Treaty, which 
had been sailing along to easy ratification, stalled because of NATO activity in the Balkans, 
and due to concerns about NATO expansion in the Baltics.  This shows that an activist 
legislative branch is diverting Russia from previously agreed upon positions, goals and 
worldview.  This may cause damage to Russia's place in the international community. 
Future elections will further develop the makeup and demographics of the Duma.  
Also, if a growing number of the electorate participates in voting, it will enable the Duma to 
more accurately reflect the needs and desires of the Russian public.  Future elections will also 
tell us the direction the executive branch will lead.  Due to the strength of the executive in 
Russia, future presidents will finish the job of molding the office that Yeltsin began in 1993.  In 
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time, we will see if Yeltsin’s example leaves an indelible mark, if future presidents can carry a 
strong role in international policy and if a balance can be had with the Duma. 
Unlike their American counterparts, the two Russian branches have not yet learned to 
work smoothly with one another.  And, NATO enlargement became a tool to further divide 
the two sides.  If Russia can create a coherent policy regarding enlargement, START-2 and 
its role in the world, then its ability to focus on its problems of crime, disappearance of 
national resources and economic decline may prove effective.  At that point, perhaps future 
rounds of expansion will not appear as a sneak attack on Russia's Imperial borders.   
Since 1993, there has been substantial evolution in executive/legislative relations in 
Russia.  Constitutionally, legislative action and activism in the realm of foreign policy does not 
exist.  In the reality of the Russian political system, legislative action and activism are 
necessary and thrives.  The Russian president, while constitutionally strong, is steered by 
concerns of Duma members.  This may very well be a condition related to Boris Yeltsin.  
Yeltsin’s administration constantly changed, and this greatly influenced his foreign policy, but 
more importantly it affected the Duma’s perception of his foreign policy – or it is reflective of 
the direction of the Duma’s interests and political power.  A more stable administration may 
handle foreign policy in a different way, and may coordinate more directly with the Duma on 
Russia’s approach to international affairs. 
The experience of the relations between the two branches over NATO enlargement 
provides the opportunity for an active Duma, one that carries more political power in the area 
of foreign policy than the constitution enumerates.  The Russian branches are growing into and 
forming their roles.  The evolution of the relations between these two branches will take place 
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over a much greater period than just less than a decade.  Over time, we will see how the two 
branches determine policy of great importance to this young nation, and what shape their roles 
will form in the future. 
Currently, the war in Chechnya and international reaction to it fosters resentment from 
Russian leaders of the lessening role Russia has in the world.  Whether a democracy in 
Russia’s condition can find partners to counter Western dominated internationalism may be 
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